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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
presses is adopted in subsequent decisions, for in this case the court stressed
the fact that the petition charged "negligence" rather than "unskillfullness".
The opinion seems to admit that if the petition had charged unskillfullness an
instruction would have been proper which would have allowed recovery if the
defendant physician had merely failed to "possess" the requisite knowledge.
If this is true, then the court is departing from its past decisions and is
adopting the old common law to the effect that it is the party's own fault if he
undertakes without having sufficient skill, or if he applies less than the occa-
sion requires. Story on Bailments sec. 431; 3 Shars. Blacks. p. 122, and note,
and p. 169; Connor v. Winton (1856) 8 Ind. 315. Perhaps this would be the
better rule, since then recovery for damage from treatment by the so called
"quacks" would be made easier for innocent victims.
It is interesting to note further that the instruction as affirmed requires
"the defendant to possess and use that degree of knowledge, skill and care
ordinarily possessed and used by competent and skillful surgeons in St. Louis
or similar communities." To use this instruction the jury may judge the de-
fendant either according to physicians in St. Louis, or according to the skill
which physicians in similar localities ordinarily possess. In a prevous case
the Missouri Supreme Court took the position that there should be no limit-
ing the standard for judging the skill of a physician to the local vicinity of
the practitioner. Krinard v. Westerman, supra. On the other hand, Mis-
souri has held that a physician should possess and use that degree of skill
and learning ordinarily possessed and exercised by members of his profession
in similar localities. Trask v. Dunnigan (1927) 299 S. W. 116. The federal
courts as well as the majority of the states have adhered to the opposite view.
Kallock v. Hoagland (C. C. A. 6,1917) 239 F. 252; 21 R. C. L. p. 381 and note.
It may be inferred that the instruction is a departure from the established
rule in Missouri, since it allows the jury to choose between two alternatives.
The argument against the federal rule is that it subjects one to a test in his
own locality regardless of the fact that his particular community may be of
higher standard than the average and thereby places the defendant at a dis-
advantage. Likewise if the locality in which the physician practices fosters
a lower grade of physicians than similar communities, then the plaintiff suf-
fers. The safer and more liberal standard in regard to determining the
skill and care of a physician seems to be the one which Missouri has followed
in the past. Let us hope that this case will not be extended to change that
rule. H. G., '35.
TAXATION-UNITED STATES INHERITANCE TAX-"PRoPERTY SITUATED IN
THE UNITED STATEs".-The decedent was a subject of Great Britain and a
resident of Cuba. On his death there were found in a safe deposit box in
New York City certain stocks and bonds of domestic corporations and other
stocks and bonds issued by corporations incorporated outside of the United
States. Held: Both classes of securities are subject to the federal estate tax.
Burnet v. Brooks (1933) 53 S. Ct. 457.
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The federal statute purports to levy a tax upon that part of the gross estate
of non-residents which "at the time of his death is situated in the United
states". It specifically provides that for the purpose of this act "stock in
domestic corporations owned and held by a non-resident decedent shall
be deemed property within the United States". Revenue Act of 1916, 39
Stat. 778; Revenue Act of 1918, 40 Stat. 1098; Revenue Act of 1921, 42 Stat.
280; Revenue Act of 1924, 43 Stat. 305; Revenue Act of 1926, 44 Stat. 72;
Revenue Act of 1928, 45 Stat. 862; Revenue Act of 1932, 47 Stat. 280; 26
U. S. C. 1095. The regulations issued by the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue specifically imposed a tax upon securities physically in the United
States. These statutes were adopted during the period in which it was
thought that a state of the United States might tax certificates of stock or
bonds which were physically within it even though the decedent was domi-
ciled elsewhere. Maxwell v. Bugbee (1919) 250 U. S. 525; note (1926) 42
A. L. R. 378. Likewise, it was then believed that a state could tax stock in
domestic corporations even though the decedent resided elsewhere. Bullen
v. Wisconsin (1916) 240 U. S. 625; Blodgett v. Silverman (1928) 277 U. S.
1; note (1926) 42 A. L. R. 330. Subsequently the Supreme Court of the
United States shifted its view and ruled that a state could not impose a tax
upon securities physically present in it, unless they had acquired a business
situs there. Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota (1930) 280 U. S. 204;
Baldwin v. Missouri (1930) 281 U. S. 586. This was extended shortly so as
to hold invalid a state tax based on the fact that the corporation was located
in the taxing state, although the decedent was domiciled elsewhere. Beidler v.
South Carolina Tax Commission (1930) 282 U. S. 1 (debts); First National
Bank v. Maine (1932) 284 U. S. 312; Fordyce and Fordyce, Death Transfer
Taxation of Stock (1932) 17 ST. Louis L. REv. 287. All these cases referred
solely to the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as the con-
stitutional basis for the invalidation of the state taxes.
Under such circumstances it would seem logical that the powers of the
United States would be similarly circumscribed because the language of the
due process clause of the Fifth Amendment is identical with that of the
Fourteenth. It is true that there were dicta in the early case of Eidman v.
Martinez (1902) 184 U. S. 578 that such a federal tax would be valid, but this
case had been decided at a time when the similar state taxes were also valid.
The Board of Tax Appeals was called to pass on the questions involved in the
principal case in February, 1931. The Board construed the statute so as
not to apply to securities in foreign corporations which were merely physical-
ly present in the United States, but upheld the tax on securities of domestic
corporations. Brooks v. Commissioner (1931) 22 B. T. A. 71. This con-
struction was largely based on the view that the construction claimed by the
government would render the statute unconstitutional. In the Estate of
Garvan, First National Bank of Boston, Adm'r v. Commissioner (1932) 25
B. T. A. 612 the same result was reached, although one commissioner dis-
sented on the ground that the tax on the stock of domestic corporations,
which was expressly levied by the statute, was made unconstitutional by the
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logic of First National Bank of Boston v. Maine. Neither of these decisions
were accepted by the Commissioner. On appeal they were both affirmed by
different circuit courts of appeal. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v.
Brooks (C. C. A. 2, 1932) 60 F. (2d) 890; First National Bank v. Commis-
sioner (C. C. A. 1, 1933); Commerce Clearing House Federal Tax Service
(1933) par. 9158.
This unsettled state of the law has been resolved by the instant decision.
Chief Justice Hughes holds that as a matter of interpretation of language
the statute is meant to apply to securities physically present in the United
States, for it was enacted when it was thought that such securities had a
situs for all purposes at the place where they were physically. The opinion
explains that the decisions as to the state taxing power are not applicable
precedents in that the jurisdiction of the states is "defined in view of the rela-
tion of the States to each other in the Federal Union" while in this field the
United States possesses "sovereignty in the fullest sense". A similar dis-
tinction was utilized in upholding a tax upon a yacht owned by a citizen of
the United States but which had a permanent situs in a foreign country, even
though at that time it had been held that a state could not tax such property.
United States v. Bennett (1914) 232 U.S. 299; cf. Frick v. Pennsylvania (1925)
268 U. S. 473 (which cites the chief earlier cases limiting the power of the
states). Although the rfsult in the present case makes possible serious in-
ternational double taxation, it would seem that this is an evil which should be
remedied by international treaties rather than by judicial decisions which
might hamper the United States in the negotiations of such compacts. It is
to be regretted that the Supreme Court was not more careful in phrasing its
decisions as to state taxation, for if their true basis is that given by the
present case the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has little
to do with the results obtained. G. W. S., '33.
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